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ABSTRACT
This article analyzes the economic effects of public investments in Russia. The cor-
relation between gross regional product growth rates and public capital accumu-
lation has been identified. It has been found that regional investments stimulate 
growth much better than federal ones. Therefore, the transfer of federal resources 
to regional levels, as well as a more precise tailoring of investment policies to the 
needs of individual territories, should contribute to a rise in productivity and an 
increase in regional growth rates. The findings show that investments from sub-
national budget sources are closely correlated to regional tax revenues. Therefore, 
the fine-tuning of the revenue-sharing mechanism in the larger fiscal federalism 
framework, the expansion of the regional tax base, the improvement of tax collec-
tion and tax administration systems, and other related measures represent the main 
focus areas for expanding investment opportunities at the provincial level. In the 
long term, this way of regional development is expected to be more efficient and 
sustainable compared to the current emphasis on the implementation of large de-
velopmental projects at the expense of the federal budget. These aspects of Russia’s 
experience seems to be valid for the entire Eurasian continent, as seen by the scale of 
infrastructure projects initiated there in recent years under the framework of “One 
belt-One Road” and other development initiatives
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HIGHLIGHTS
1. Subnational investments from regional budgets positively influence the rate of re-
gional development, whereas the role of federal investment, most often, is negative 
or statistically insignificant
2. The fine-tuning of the revenue-sharing mechanism, the expansion of the regional 
tax base, the improvement of tax collection and tax administration systems, and other 
related measures represent the main focus areas for expanding investment opportu-
nities at the provincial level
3. Since federal investments are considered inferior to regional ones in terms of pro-
vincial growth stimulation, transferring most of the investment resources to the sub-
national level could be beneficial for overall growth rates
4. Comprehensive use of local resources for federal construction projects allows 
to maximize the macroeconomic effects not only in Russia, but also in several 
Eurasian states, currently implementing large-scale infrastructure development 
initiatives
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АННОТАЦИЯ
В данной статье на примере российских регионов исследуются экономические 
эффекты бюджетного инвестирования. Оценка корреляции темпов роста ва-
лового регионального продукта с накоплением общественного капитала по-
казывает, что региональные инвестиции стимулируют рост намного лучше, 
чем федеральные. Следовательно, передача федеральных ресурсов на регио-
нальный уровень, а также более точная ориентация инвестиционной полити-
ки на особенности отдельных территорий должны способствовать ускорению 
национального экономического развития. Кроме того, инвестиции за счет суб-
нацональных бюджетов тесно коррелируют с региональными налоговыми по-
ступлениями. Следовательно, точная настройка механизма бюджетного феде-
рализма в области доходов, увеличение налоговой базы субъектов Российской 
Федерации, улучшение собираемости налогов и другие аналогичные меры яв-
ляются главным направлением расширения инвестирования на региональном 
уровне. В долгосрочном плане, этот путь территориального развития представ-
ляется более эффективным и устойчивым, чем реализация крупных проектов 
за счет федерального бюджета. Перечисленные аспекты российского опыта 
актуальны для всего евразийского континента, где в последние годы в рамках 
проекта «Один пояс-один путь» и других инициатив начато создание крупных 
инфраструктурных объектов за счет бюджетных источников
КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА
Экономический рост, развитие инфраструктуры, бюджетные инвестиции, ре-
гиональная экономика, налоговые доходы
ОСНОВНЫЕ ПОЛОЖЕНИЯ
1. Капиталовложения из региональных бюджетов позитивно влияют на темпы 
территориального развития, однако роль федеральных инвестиций, чаще все-
го, отрицательна или статистически незначима
2. Увеличение налоговых доходов субъектов Федерации представляет собой глав-
ный и наиболее эффективный путь расширения региональных инвестиций
3. Поскольку федеральные инвестиции уступают региональным в плане терри-
ториального стимулирования роста, передача большинства инвестиционных 
ресурсов на субнациональный уровень может привести к повышению суммар-
ных темпов экономического развития
4. Комплексное использование местных ресурсов в процессе строительства за 
счет федерального бюджета позволяет максимизировать получаемые макро-
экономические эффекты не только в России, но и в ряде Евразийских госу-
дарств, осуществляющих крупные проекты инфраструктурного развития
Introduction and the scope  
of this research
The Eurasian continent deservedly 
draws attention from all over the world 
as a unique research field for specialists 
in territorial development. Eurasia stands 
out for its experience with multilateral fi-
nancial institutions, its operation of large 
integration groupings, and its achieve-
ment of intensive economic interaction 
among key players. Important develop-
ments in recent years have included new 
large-scale development initiatives, the es-
tablishment of previously absent institu-
tions, and the emergence of additional op-
portunities for infrastructure construction 
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within the frameworks of: the Eurasian 
Economic Union promoted by Russia, the 
One Belt-One Road initiative suggested by 
China, the Asian Development Bank lead 
by Japan, and many other important and 
actively working organizations.
In the vast Eurasian expanse, Russia 
possesses the largest territory and has ac-
cumulated the broadest experience in spa-
tial development. As recent history shows, 
the “Turn East” policy initiated by Russia 
in the middle of the last decade gradually 
acquired the features of a comprehensive 
governmental program, one effectively 
oriented for sustainable regional growth. 
The implementation of large infrastructure 
projects, the shifting resources to the Asian 
part of the country and the establishment 
of regional development institutions have 
had a profound effect on the economic dy-
namics of the Russian provinces.
 All these facts underline the impor-
tance of analyzing and disseminating best 
practices in the accumulation of public 
capital for regional development. The 
existing economic literature on this topic 
has taken one of two approaches. The first 
examines the role of the state in the forma-
tion of public capital and the related pro-
ductivity issues [1; 2]. The second group 
of studies views the accumulation process 
as a precondition for the performance of 
public finance functions such as macro-
economic regulation, income redistribu-
tion and the provision of public goods [3].
Russia-based studies have been con-
ducted in both directions but reached 
contradictory conclusions. Some papers 
argue in support of the positive role of in-
vestment (including public ones) in boost-
ing economic growth [4], while others in-
sist budgetary investments have no or an 
adverse impact on both growth rates and 
the reduction of regional disparities [5].
Even more important than these con-
flicting conclusions, however, is the fact 
that significant dimensions of Russia’s 
situation have not yet been properly ana-
lyzed in the economic literature. Among 
these issues are: the breakdown of pub-
lic investment into federal and regional 
sources, the grouping of Russian prov-
inces according to the dynamics of the 
investment process, and the statistical re-
lationship between public investment and 
regional growth rates. These omissions 
constitute the focus of this paper. After an 
empirical overview of budgetary invest-
ment understood as an increase of public 
capital, this paper looks at an econometric 
model assessing the interaction of invest-
ment and economic growth in Russia’s re-
gions, before concluding with some policy 
implications. These topics provide impor-
tant insight into the promotion of interna-
tional projects currently being implement-
ed on the Eurasian continent.
Theoretical issues and literature review
Existing approaches to the analysis of 
budget investments can be divided into 
two parts. The first group of works consid-
ers investment as a form of accumulation 
of social capital and deals with its produc-
tivity issues. In particular, a representa-
tive analysis of meta-data from 93 studies 
on this subject made it possible to con-
clude that in the post-war period in most 
countries the cumulative effect of public 
spending was rather positive, although 
not very significant [1]. A subsequent re-
view of 76 sources led to a similar conclu-
sion about the positive and statistically 
significant but relatively small contribu-
tion of social capital to the growth of gross 
output [6]. The positive contribution was 
limited to the educational and infrastruc-
ture components of investments in social 
capital. In the regional context, the latter’s 
positive influence was recorded for US 
states [7]. An analysis of the prefectures of 
Japan showed that the effect depended on 
the study period and the type of region. 
At the stage of rapid economic growth in 
the 1950–1970s, the role of social capital 
was unambiguously positive. However, 
in the 1980s and 1990s, negative contri-
bution prevailed in less developed areas, 
indicating an excessive accumulation of 
public capital [8]. This was the result of 
significant changes in the Japanese region-
al policy after the first oil shock, when the 
center of gravity was switched from the 
stimulation of growth to a more even dis-
tribution of public goods throughout the 
country [9; 10].
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For Russia, such studies have long 
been limited to the contribution of all ac-
cumulated capital to GDP growth or total 
factor productivity (a literature review is 
provided in [11]). In the first work, which 
divided the role of private and public 
funds, a positive and significant correlation 
of the output with public investment was 
established, but the accuracy of the con-
structed model raised serious doubts [12]. 
Later, a more accurate econometric analy-
sis confirmed the conclusion about the pos-
itive and significant contribution of social 
capital to the economic dynamics [13]. 
The second group of works in the 
field of budgetary investments consid-
ers them as the process of formation and 
maintenance of fixed capital necessary for 
performing the basic functions of public 
finance, i.e. macroeconomic regulation, 
redistribution of resources and provision 
of public goods. Theoretically, budget in-
vestments should act as a tool to stimulate 
economic growth, equalize the levels of 
economic development and improve the 
social environment [3]. But according to 
the results of empirical studies, the elastic-
ity of GDP on budgetary investments can 
have negative values [14], international 
and regional convergence is not always 
followed by investment [15], and simple 
expansion of budgetary investments does 
not necessarily lead to the desired social 
outcome [16].
Studies on the materials of Russia also 
lead to contradictory conclusions. Some 
papers cite arguments in support of the 
positive role of investment (including 
budgetary ones) in boosting the growth of 
the economy [4], while others mention the 
zero or even negative impact of budgetary 
investments on growth rates and regional 
differences [5]. However, the greatest dif-
ficulty is that some aspects of the Russian 
situation are not represented in the eco-
nomic literature at all. This refers to the 
division of federal and regional invest-
ments, the analysis of different functions 
of public finance, the statistical correlation 
of budget investments and the quality of 
the social environment, etc.
Both mentioned approaches to budget 
investments (productivity of social capital 
and functions of public finance) seem to 
be really important and promising. How-
ever, the research on productivity (the first 
approach) is nearly impossible, because of 
the absence of necessary data. That is why 
this paper is focused on the stimulation, 
redistribution and public goods provision 
functions of budget investment (the sec-
ond approach). After this brief literature 
review, the paper describes the specif-
ics of budget investments, followed by a 
statistical analysis of the correlation of in-
vestment with regional growth rates and 
the quality of the social environment, and 
concludes with policy implications and 
recommendations. Such research provides 
a new answer to the question of priorities 
and prospects for investment policy in 
modern Russia.
Public investments and tax revenues  
in Russia
The existing information on public 
investments in Russia is very limited. Ac-
cording to available data, one can assess 
only the broadest features of the invest-
ment process. The main indicators related 
to the investment process are shown in 
Table 1.
Table 1
The main indicators of the investment 
process in Russia, %
Indicator 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2016
Gross savings 
to GDP 
27.5 33.6 30.6 25.1 27.2 27.3
Gross fixed 
capital forma-
tion to gross 
savings
76.4 54.5 58.1 83.7 76.3 77.0
Gross fixed 
capital forma-
tion to GDP
17.5 16.5 16.7 20.4 19.6 20.4
Source: [17]. 
Gross savings in Russia are only 
slightly lower than that of the middle-in-
come countries, while gross fixed capital 
formation lags far behind. The gap be-
tween the rate of gross savings and capi-
tal formation reaches 5 % of GNI and is 
among the highest in the world (Table 2). 
This figure illustrates the well-known fact 
that Russian savings do not turn into in-
vestments because of a weak financial sys-
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tem, a bad investment climate and conser-
vative government policies. 
In 1995–2016, the ratio of budget-
ary investments to Russian GDP fluctu-
ated between 2.3 and 4.1 % (Table 3). This 
roughly matched the figures from the bot-
tom quarter of OECD countries, the aver-
age of which was around 4 % [19].
As for the relative contribution from 
federal and subnational sources, during 
the 1990s we observed a reduction in the 
federal contribution (from 1.9 % to 0.9 % 
of GDP), which reflects the general shift 
of expenditures to the subnational level 
(Figure). 
However, since 2006, there has been 
an increase in the distribution of federal 
sources, which peaked in the crisis year of 
2009 (1.9 %), and then started to fluctuate 
between 1.2–1.5 %. From 2010–2016, fed-
eral investments exceeded regional ones 
by 0.1 to 0.6 %. Apparently, this dynamic 
is a reflection of the evolving reality of 
Russian budgetary federalism.
Table 2
Gross fixed capital formation and gross savings, % of GNI
Country Gross fixed capital formation Gross savings
2005 2016 2005 2016
Brazil 17 15 17 14
China 41 44 48 46
India 39 30 38 30
Japan 25 23 28 27
Kazakhstan 31 27 29 21
Poland 20 20 17 19
Russian Federation 20 23 31 25
South Africa 18 19 15 16
Ukraine 23 22 26 17
United States 23 20 18 18
Uzbekistan 18 25 ... ...
World 25 24 26 24
Low income 17 26 ... 14
Lower middle income 28 27 29 28
Upper middle income 30 32 34 31
High income 23 21 23 22
Source: [18].
Table 3
Investments in fixed assets in Russia
Indicator 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2016
billion rubles (1995 — trillions of rubles)
GDP 1 429.0 7 306.0 21 610.0 46 309.0 83 232.6 86 043.6
Investments 267.0 1 165.2 3 611.1 9 152.0 13 897.2 14 639.8
Investments*, including: 267.0 1 053.7 2 983.2 6 625.0 10 496.3 11 266.9
federal budget 27.0 69.2 202.2 661.9 1 185.5 1047.9
subnational budgets** 27.5 151.2 365.1 542.8 736.0 907.2
% of GDP
GDP 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Investments 18.7 15.9 16.7 20.3 16.7 17.0
Investments*, including: 18.7 14.4 13.8 14.7 12.6 13.1
federal budget 1.9 0.9 0.9 1.5 1.4 1.2
subnational budgets** 1.9 2.1 1.7 1.2 0.9 1.1
* Since 2000: without small business entities and unobserved economic activity.
** Budgets of Russian provinces and municipalities.
Source: [20, pp. 579–581].
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Third, the largest share of public in-
vestments (about 26 % of all federal invest-
ments in 2016) was directed to transport 
and communications, first and foremost 
to road construction. Nevertheless, as a 
percentage of GDP, road construction was 
only 0.3 % of GDP in 2016, compared to 
the 1 % recommended by the European 
Union to its members.
During the 2000s, there was consider-
able growth in the amount of investment 
carried out on the basis of the program 
budgeting method. In the federal budget, 
the share of programmed investments in-
creased from 16.8 % in 2001 to 47.4 % in 
2016. It should be noted that more than 
half (55.0 %) of all allocations went to the 
program “Development of the Transport 
System of Russia in 2010–2020”.
Budgetary investments are very un-
evenly distributed across the country. 
During the same period of 2000–2015, the 
share of the 10 richest regions (leading in 
terms of per capita GRP) fell from 60 % to 
38.2 %, while the share of the 10 poorest 
regions increased from 1 % to 6.8 %. Clear-
ly, the spatial distribution of investments 
has become more egalitarian.
An interesting picture is drawn by the 
analysis of the spatial distribution of pub-
lic investment stock. Since the deflators 
for budget investments are not available, 
we will calculate them in US dollars at the 
official exchange rate. For the period of 
1995–2015, budgets of all levels invested 
in the Russian economy total 751.5 billion 
dollars (346.7 federal and 404.8 regional, 
see Table 4).
44.7 % of federal investment was chan-
neled into the top ten regions. This composi-
tion illustrates the federal government’s in-
vestment priorities, which include the two 
Russian capitals with their adjacent territo-
ries, a number of provinces with large na-
tional projects (the Sochi Olympics in 2014, 
the Summer Universiade in 2013, the APEC 
summit in 2012, etc.), and the North Cauca-
sian republics that were severely damaged 
during a war against Islamic terror. Sub-
national investments are distributed even 
more unevenly. The top ten account for 63.8 
% of public investment, 47.2 % for the first 
three provinces and 25.6 % for Moscow. 
The allocation of subnational investments 
depends, predominantly, on the financial 
capabilities of the provinces and reflects the 
uneven distribution of budgetary resources 
across the country.
Tax revenues are also very unevenly 
distributed throughout the country. This 
is a well-documented fact, thoroughly dis-
cussed in the relevant literature [21–23]. 
52.5 % of tax revenues are collected in the 
10 most economically developed prov-
inces of Russia, with Moscow accounting 
for 22.3 % of the total amount. Preliminary 
estimates show that the tax revenues of re-
gional budgets are closely related to bud-
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
500 000
400 000
300 000
200 000
100 000
0
Private Subnational Federal
Investment in fixed assets in Russia, millions of USD at official rate
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Table 4
Spatial distribution of public investment and tax revenues (stock, 1995–2015),  
billion dollars
Federal budget sources Subnational budget sources Tax revenues*
1 Moscow 34.2 1 Moscow 103.6 1 Moscow 442.5
2 Krasnodarskii krai 24.5 2 Tumen oblast 65.4 2 Tumen oblast 169.9
3 Saint-Petersburg 19.2 3 Saint-Petersburg 22.1 3 Saint-Petersburg 114.3
4 Moscovskaya oblast 13.9 4 Tatarstan republic 13.4 4 Moscovskaya oblast 110.2
5 Primorskii krai 13.1 5 Bashkort. republic 10.7 5 Sverdlovskaya oblast 53.8
6 Dagestan republic 11.9 6 Krasnodarskii krai 9.3 6 Krasnoyarskii krai 50.7
7 Tatarstan republic 10.3 7 Moscovskaya oblast 9.2 7 Tatarstan republic 49.2
8 Voronezh oblast 9.3 8 Sverdlovskaya oblast 8.7 8 Krasnodarskii krai 48.7
9 Chechen republic 9.3 9 Dagestan republic 8.3 9 Bashkortostan republic 39.4
10 Rostov oblast 8.7 10 Nizhegorodskaya 
oblast
6.9 10 Samarskaya oblast 39.1
Total for 10 provinces 155.0 Total for 10 provinces 258.1 Total for 10 provinces 1 117.7
Total Russia 346.7 Total Russia 404.8 Total Russia 1 981.3
* For the years 2000–2015.
get investments, with the partial correla-
tion coefficients being positive for regional 
(0.6, significant at 0.01) and negative (–0.28, 
significant at 0.01) for federal investments. 
Such a preliminary conclusion seems to be 
very important for this research and re-
quires additional verification.
This brief overview shows that both 
public investments and tax revenues dif-
fer greatly in volume, dynamics and spa-
tial allocation. We can reasonably suggest 
that they also have differing impacts on 
the economic dynamics of the tax collect-
ing and investments receiving provinces. 
Let us try to test this assumption using the 
available data.
Correlation of public investment, 
tax revenues and economic growth
In this part we will try to establish a 
correlation between the indicators of pub-
lic investments and the parameters of the 
regional economy, concentrating on the 
efficacy of public finances in stimulate 
economic growth. The estimation model 
is described by the formula:
1 1
,
n n
inv i i i i
i i
Y Inv X Zµ β β β ε
= =
= + + + +∑ ∑
where Y is the dependent variable, namely: 
GRP index; μ is a constant; Inv are shares 
of federal, subnational and other (private) 
investments in GRP; i — provinces of Rus-
sia; βinv and βi are the estimated partial 
correlation coefficients; X is a vector of 
constantly present control variables; Z is a 
vector of additional control variables that 
reflect the characteristics of the regional 
economy; ε is the statistical error.
The observation period covers 13 years 
from 1997 to 2009. Data on autonomous 
okrugs are included for the larger provinc-
es, and the Chechen Republic is excluded 
due to missing data, bringing the number 
of regions to 79. The vector of constantly 
present control variables X consists of the 
following indicators: 1) Labor (index of em-
ployment); 2) Tax-revenues (tax revenues 
of subnational budgets as % of GRP). The 
vector Z includes Jan-temp (the normal-
ized average temperature of January with 
the value for Russia taken as 1). In addition, 
some dummy variables were introduced 
into the X vector, such as dummies for the 
crisis years of 1998 and 2009 (cr98, cr09) as 
well as for the Republics of Kalmykia, Mor-
dovia and the Chukotka Autonomous Ok-
rug, which have a number of outstanding 
features in regional development and in-
vestment process (kalmyk, mordov, chukot).
Statistical characteristics of the vari-
ables are provided in Table 5.
The estimation results are shown in 
the Table 6. Estimation 1 includes only 
control variables X, in Estimation 2 the 
Jan-temp variable is added, and Estima-
tion 3 includes the entire set of control 
variables X and Z.
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Table 5
Description of variables (1997-2009, for 79 regions)
Variable Mean Min Max SD Description
1.Inv-priv 0.174 0.002 1.023 0.096 Private investment share in GRP (%)
2.Inv-reg 0.020 0.000 0.227 0.018 Subnational budgetary investments share in GRP (%)
3.Inv-fed 0.031 0.000 0.433 0.041 Federal budgetary investment share in GRP (%)
4.Labor 0.998 0.866 1.173 0.024 Employment index
5.Tax-revenues 0.144 0.012 1.148 0.056 Tax income of subnational budgets to GRP (%)
6.Jan-temp 0.984 0.076 3.100 0.660 The average temperature in January (normalized 
with Russia’s average value = 1)
Source: Rosstat data.
Table 6
OLS estimation results (GRP index as a dependent variable)
Independent variables  
and estimation results
Estimation
1 2 3
Intercept –0.159 (–1.802) –0.142 (–1.599) 0.422 (5.085)
1.Inv-priv 0.200* (7.074) 0.199* (7.052) 0.217* (8.753)
2.Inv-reg 0.066** (2.018) 0.062*** (1.899) 0.088* (3.090)
3.Inv-fed –0.06** (–1.997) -0.07* (–2.264) –0.030 (–1.259)
4.Labor 0.384* (13.542) 0.380* (13.413) 0.207* (7.721)
5.Tax-revenues –0.16* (–5.181) –0.152* (–4.885) –0.244* (–8.019)
6.Jan-temp – –0.06* (–2.175) –0.08* (–3.314)
7.Kalmyk – – 0.034 (1.331)
8.Mordov – – 0.035 (1.495)
9.Chukot – – 0.154* (5.651)
10.Crisys-98 – – –0.33* (–13.080)
11.Crisys-09 – – –0.37* (–14.912)
Number of observations 1 027 1 027 1 027
Multiplied R2 0.479 0.483 0.668
Adjusted R2 0.225 0.229 0.441
F-statistic 60.907 51.731 74.730
Standard Error 0.065 0.065 0.055
T-statistic in parenthesis; statistical significance: * = 0,01; ** = 0,05; *** = 0.10.
All estimation models indicate a dif-
ference in correlation between invest-
ments and GRP depending on the source 
of financing. Private investment (1.Inv-
priv), as common sense would suggest, 
has a positive and statistically significant 
impact on the gross output. The same ap-
plies to regional budgetary investments 
(2.Inv-reg). Federal investment betas 
(3.Inv-fed), however, are conspicuously 
negative. This means either that federal 
investment slows economic development 
or that it is systematically allocated to 
lagging regions. In either case, the stimu-
lus provided by federal investments to 
regional economies is not only low, but, 
quite probably, negative.
Panel data estimates return the same 
results (Table 7).
The panel data results confirm the 
earlier conclusion about the serious dif-
ference between the correlations of cer-
tain types of investments with the GRP 
index. Private and regional investments 
have a significantly positive impact on the 
growth of provincial economies, but the 
correlation with federal investments ap-
pears to be steadily negative.
The role of federal investment  
in stimulating the provincial economy
The significantly negative correla-
tion between federal investments and 
the rate of provincial economic growth 
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is one of the most important results of 
the performed statistical analysis. This is 
an unexpected phenomenon, especially 
when compared to the state development 
programs that have been implemented 
in recent years. Conversely, regional in-
vestments have had a clearly positive im-
pact on growth rates. This situation has 
already been described in the economic 
literature and has been repeatedly noted, 
for example, in Japan from 1990–2008 
[14]. In some sense, this outcome appears 
quite understandable, given the central 
government’s focus on projects of nation-
al importance, projects which do not nec-
essarily generate immediate economic 
returns, as opposed to the activities of re-
gional authorities, which are less subject 
to the influence of politics or corruption, 
and which generally produce greater eco-
nomic benefits. 
One reason for the low stimulus 
provided by federal investments can be 
attributed to the inevitable drop in the 
marginal productivity of capital that co-
incides with its accumulation. The exces-
sive capacity of social capital (unneces-
sary bridges, roads, dams, etc.) is indeed 
Таблица 7
Panel data estimation results (GRP index as a dependent variable)
Independent variables  
and estimation results
BE (t) FE (t) GLS RE (z)
Intercept 0.130 (0.58) 0.440 (5.01) –0.422 (5.08)
1.Inv-priv 0.107* (4.20) 0.204* (8.01) 0.168* (8.75)
2.Inv-reg 0.372* (2.58) 0.275** (1.69) 0.354* (3.09)
3.Inv-fed –0.164** (–2.73) –0.002 (0.03) –0.06*** (–1.27)
4.Labor 0.944* (4.14) 0.621* (7.00) 0.654* (7.82)
5.Tax-revenues –0.318* (–4.01) –0.315* (–6.66) –0.322* (–8.01)
6.Jan-temp –0.09* (–3.93) Dropped –0.009* (–3.32)
7.Kalmyk 0.043* (2.52) Dropped 0.022 (1.33)
8.Mordov 0.025*** (1.80) Dropped 0.023 (1.49)
9.Chukot 0.109* (4.74) Dropped 0.102* (5.65)
10.Crisys-98 Dropped –0.091* (–12.74) –0.092* (–13.09)
11.Crisys-09 Dropped –0.105* (–14.85) –0.102* (–14.91)
Number of obs. (groups) 1 027 (79) 1 027 (79) 1 027 (79)
R2 within 0.237 0.442 0.441
R2 between 0.588 0.198 0.549
R2 overall 0.255 0.419 0.447
Wald chi2 – – 821.86
F-statistic 10.96 106.89 –
BE — between effects (t-statistic in parenthesis), FE — fixed effects (t-statistic in parenthesis), 
GLS  RE — general least square model with random effects (z-statistic in parenthesis).
a by-product of Japan’s fiscal stimulus 
policy. However, in Russia’s case, the 
poor state of the country’s economic 
and social infrastructure means that this 
is not a likely explanation for the ineffi-
ciency, nor is excessive capacity likely to 
become a significant problem within the 
next few decades.
Fortunately, a much more likely ex-
planation for the Russian economic situa-
tion exists. A massive influx of budgetary 
investments can lead to a suppression of 
private funding. Indeed, the economy of 
any region has an “absorption capacity” 
in the form of limited opportunities for 
roads, electricity, labor markets and other 
factors. If this capacity is exceeded, then 
public investment displaces private, ini-
tiating a so-called “crowding out effect”. 
The clearest illustrations of the crowding 
out mechanism come from the Winter 
Olympics in Nagano (1998), the Olympic 
Games in London (2012) and the G-20 
Summit in St. Petersburg (2013). These 
enormous public events led to a decrease 
of customers to peripheral private facili-
ties, because tourists feared visiting po-
tentially overcrowded cities.
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The existence of a “crowding out ef-
fect” might be proved by a negative corre-
lation of federal and private investments 
and, in fact, some calculations show that 
federal and private investments have 
just such a negative correlation [24]. This 
phenomenon, however, likely has several 
causes. First of all, the central govern-
ment tends to invests in regions that are 
not attractive to private capital, in order 
to compensate for a lack of financial re-
sources. However, we should not reject 
the earlier hypothesis that large federal 
projects in small regions could displace 
or “crowd out” private investments. Most 
likely, both processes proceed simultane-
ously and their relative importance could 
only be separated by conducting further 
research.
Conclusion and policy implications
Several important conclusions can be 
drawn from this statistical analysis. First, 
budget investment in Russia clearly falls 
into federal and subnational categories. 
These investments are concentrated in 
different regions, have differing struc-
tures, and vary in their ability to stimu-
late gross output. Investments from 
regional budgets, as a rule, positively 
influence the rates of regional develop-
ment. The role of federal investment, 
most often, is negative or statistically in-
significant. Consequently, the concentra-
tion of financial resources at the national 
level, which has increased in recent years, 
is an important trend within the Russian 
government, which orients itself around 
federal political priorities more than re-
gional economic concerns.
Second, our findings show that invest-
ments from subnational budget sources 
are closely correlated to regional tax rev-
enues. Therefore, the fine-tuning of the 
revenue-sharing mechanism in the larger 
fiscal federalism framework, the expan-
sion of the regional tax base, the improve-
ment of tax collection and tax administra-
tion systems, and other related measures 
represent the main focus areas for ex-
panding investment opportunities at the 
provincial level. In the long term, this way 
of regional development is expected to be 
more efficient and sustainable compared 
to the current emphasis on the implemen-
tation of large developmental projects at 
the expense of the federal budget. 
Third, the search for a balance of po-
litical and economic factors should be 
based on regional inclusion and a thor-
ough consideration of regional specif-
ics. In most Russian provinces, federal 
investments are inferior to regional ones 
in terms of efficient growth stimulation. 
Apparently, this conclusion could serve as 
the basis for reviewing the existing mod-
els of intergovernmental fiscal relations 
and transferring most of the investment 
resources to the subnational level. As for 
the small and poorly-funded provinces of 
Russia, the most urgent task is to increase 
the scale of federal inflows. In regions suf-
fering from an overall lack of capital, the 
optimal policy would be to expand the 
investment possibilities through all avail-
able sources. In resource-rich areas where 
budgetary investments are not effective 
enough, it makes sense to consider the 
substitution of public funds with private 
ones, but regardless of regional specifics, 
the investment allocation model should be 
based on the criteria of economic efficien-
cy. If decisions are made based on political 
considerations, the consequences should 
be assessed by evaluating the gain or loss 
of efficiency. This would introduce a mea-
surement of economic costs to each step 
taken and considerably raise the quality of 
political management.
Forth, as the development of the vast 
virgin territories accelerates on the Eur-
asian continent, huge transport and ener-
gy infrastructures will develop alongside 
new opportunities for international inte-
gration. The majority of plans carried out 
by the Eurasian Economic Union, the New 
Silk Road and the Asian Development 
Bank have important political dimensions. 
This fact once again underlines the need to 
consider both political and economic fac-
tors. The balance of political and economic 
priorities represents the most difficult part 
of development process, but theoretically 
it is achievable even when executing the 
largest projects. The example of Russia 
suggests that the inclusive development 
55
ISSN 2412-8872 Journal of Tax Reform, 2018, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 45–56
and comprehensive utilization of local re-
sources in the process of all-nation infra-
structure construction allows for enhanced 
long-term political effectiveness alongside 
a short-term gain from the revival of pro-
vincial economic dynamics. These aspects 
of Russia’s experience seems to be valid 
for the entire Eurasian continent, as seen 
by the scale of infrastructure projects initi-
ated there in recent years under the frame-
work of “One belt-One Road” and other 
development initiatives.
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